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Summary findings
Based on results from country case studies, many  The evidence from bank privatization transactions in
researchers have claimed that political constraints affect  Argentina in the 1990s supports several of their
bank privatization transactions, which in turn affect the  theoretical predictions. In particular, provinces with high
post-privatization performance of the banking sector. But  fiscal deficits were willing to accept layoffs and to
no study has either econometrically tested how political  guarantee a larger part of the privatized bank's portfolio
constraints affect bank privatization transactions or  in return for a higher price.
theoretically modeled the privatization transaction.  The tequila crisis (Mexico's economic crisis in 1994-
Clarke and Cull present a simple theoretical  95) meant that politicians could protect  fewer jobs and
framework that models the inherent tradeoffs faced by  had to assume a greater share of their public banks'
governments and potential buyers in privatization  assets. Evidence of better performance at banks
transactions involving banks. The potential buyer is  privatized after Mexico's crisis suggests that, by tying
concerned about the probability that the bank will  politicians' hands, the crisis may have brought
remain solvent, about the profits it will earn after  unforeseen benefits.
privatization, and about the price paid for the assets and  This conjecture awaits further empirical validation, but
liabilities. The government is concerned about the price  Clarke and Cull hope that by explicitly incorporating the
received for the assets, about layoffs, and about service  incentives politicians face, analysis can begin to address
coverage after privatization.  the question of why some privatizations succeed more
than others.
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Recent empirical work has indicated that privatized firms are often more efficient than
comparable public enterprises (Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Mueller, 1989; Vining and Boardman,
1992).  Similarly, many enterprises become more efficient following privatization (Galal et al.,
1994; Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Megginson, Nash,
and Van Randenborgh, 1994; World Bank,  1995).1  Although a shift  from public to private
ownership has typically improved firm level performance, that shift has often proven insufficient
by itself.  At different times and in different places, dispersed ownership, entrenched interests,
weak regulation and supervision, a lack of competitive pressure, and soft budget constraints, or a
subset of  those  factors, have provided sub-optimal  incentives for  private  owners of  firms.
Among the transition countries of  Central and  Eastern Europe, for example, recent studies
indicate that the persistence of extensive insider (worker or manager) ownership is associated
with limited progress in enterprise restructuring and poor post-privatization performnance  (Carlin
and Landesman, 1997; Pohl et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1999; Jones and Mygind, 1999).  The
variation in performance suggests that the question of how to privatize is, in many cases, at least
as important as whether to privatize.
Moreover, the privatization literature has largely ignored the incentives of the politicians
that craft privatization agreements. There are some exceptions.  World Bank (1995) identifies a
number of features of the policy environment that coincide with successful privatization, and
Lopes-de-Silanes et al. (1997) and Clarke and Cull (2000a) identify political factors that make
privatization more likely, but none of those papers formally analyze how political incentives
affect the privatization agreements themselves.  In certain transition countries, it appears that
privatization  to  insiders  has  been  relatively  unsuccessful,  but  what  were  the  possible
alternatives?  Was  privatization  to  outside  or  foreign  investors  possible  in  all  transition
economies?  Did  time  constraints militate against  lengthy negotiation  with  such  investors?
Laffont  and Tirole  (1991)  note,  however,  that  public  ownership  may be advantageous  in some  circumstances.  For
example,  it might  be easier  for a government  to pursue goals other than profit  maximization  through ownership
rather  than through  regulation. Therefore,  theory  cannot resolve  which  form of ownership  better promotes  social
3Without a better understanding of the motivations and the constraints faced by the politicians, it
is difficult to assess whether a given privatization method could be successful in other cases.
In short, relatively little attention has been devoted to the ways political incentives affect
privatization agreements, the ownership and incentive structures that result, and the performance
of privatized finns.  One reason is that there are few privatization episodes that offer enough
variation across comparable privatization contracts.  Within the context of a single country, most
privatization decisions are made by the central government.  Although the incentives of those
politicians may vary over time, the changes are unlikely to yield sufficient variation for formal
analysis.  Cross-country  analysis of  privatization contracts  may provide  more variation  in
political incentives, but measuring differences in the political and institutional environments in a
consistent, meaningful way is difficult.  We study an episode, the provincial bank privatizations
of the 1990s in Argentina that resolves many of these problems.  Privatization decisions were
made by the provincial governments, which provides us with variation along several important
dimensions, including fiscal performance of the province, bank performance and the political
incentives facing important players, while keeping other institutional details similar.  To our
knowledge, this  is the first  attempt to theoretically model the features of bank privatization
contracts and to test whether the outcomes adhered to the model's predictions.
Section II offers background on the bank privatization process in Argentina, summarizes
the relevant literature on private versus public ownership, and describes the bank privatization
contracts themselves.  Section III provides a simple theoretical framework and some simulations
to illustrate the tradeoffs facing provincial politicians in crafting these agreements.  Section IV
tests empirically some of the key predictions of the model.  Section V briefly analyzes the effects
of contract features on post-privatization performance, and section VI concludes.
welfare  in all cases.  Also, see Williamson  (1999), which  discusses  why a public  bureaucracy  might be better at
managing  some  transactions,  such  as managing  foreign  affairs,  than  a private  bureaucracy  would  be.
4II. Background
A. Private  versus  Public  Ownership:  Relevant  Literature
Although the bulk of this section will focus on performance differences between different
classes of private ownership, we note at the outset that in Argentina, as in other countries, there
are a number of reasons to expect privately owned banks to operate more efficiently than state-
owned banks would.  Laffont and Tirole (1991) point to three political reasons why private
ownership  might  be  superior  to  public  ownership.  First,  governments  may  expropriate
investment from public enterprises.  Second, they may impose multiple, fuzzy, and changing
objectives on public managers, and, third, they may be susceptible to the pressure of interest
groups in  directing those  managers. Such  opportunistic behavior  by  politicians affects  the
performance of public enterprises.  It is well known that the simple principle-agent framework
defining  relations  between  voters  (principles)  and  politicians  (agents)  is  susceptible  to
breakdown.  Since there are many votes in a legislative session, a politician might benefit from
taking a position on a single issue that is supported by an intense minority, even if most voters
lose from that decision (Downs 1957, 55-60). Consequently, politicians might gain by rewarding
supporters with  employment at a  public bank  or with  subsidized credit, even if the cost to
taxpayers is greater than the gain to the politician's supporters.
Those authors also describe a number of non-political failures in corporate governance
that typically characterize state-owned enterprises.  Because managers of public enterprises do
not own stock or stock options and are not subject to corporate takeovers that could cost them
their jobs, they typically have less reason to adopt a sufficiently long-term perspective focusing
on  productive efficiency. 2 Monitoring is,  therefore, one  reason  to  expect  private  firms to
perforrn better than state-owned enterprises.  Public enterprises also might perform worse than
similar private enterprises because managers of public enterprises answer to many principals,
who impose differing, and sometimes conflicting, objectives and constraints upon them, aside
from the expressly political objectives mentioned above (Shirley and Xu, 1998). This is likely to
2  Stiglitz (1985) notes, however, that when informational  asymmetries  between potential acquirers  and firm
managers  are large,  the disciplining  effect  of possible  takeovers  is unlikely  to be great.
5lead to sudden, unpredictable changes in the manager's  objective function and to exacerbate
standard principal-agent problems, since the manager might be able to manipulate the multiple
principals by playing them off against each other. A final problem faced by public enterprises is
that public managers often face a soft budget constraint.  Although some money-losing public
enterprises are shut down, many expect government subsidies rather than closure in response to
poor performance.  Without the threat of bankruptcy, public managers have less incentive to
manage well than their private counterparts do (Kornai, 1980; 1986).
B. Provincial Banking in Argentina.
At the beginning of the 1990s, all Argentine provinces owned at least one bank (twenty
provinces owned only one and three provinces owned two).3  The publicly owned provincial
banks performed poorly in terms of portfolio quality, the efficiency with which they generated
income, and their return on assets (Clarke and Cull, 1999,2000b). Although it may seem that the
public banks'  poor performance should have encouraged privatization, the federal system in
Argentina reduced provincial politicians'  incentives to  privatize in  several ways.  First, the
provincial banks provided the provinces with a cheap way of financing their operations.  The
provincial governments  could borrow  from  the public provincial banks,  which  would  then
discount the loans to the Central Bank of Argentina. 4 Second, the banks provided politicians
with a cheap source of patronage.  Because they could rely upon the Central Bank to help bail
out public banks facing collapse, provincial politicians could potentially use the banks to reward
supporters with access to cheap credit or employment. 5 Further, since the provinces would not
bear the full cost of bailing out poorly performing public banks, they had little reason to expend
their own resources to closely monitor bank performance.
This comfortable arrangement ended in the early 1990s, when the newly elected Menem
administration implemented the Convertibility Plan to stabilize the economy and bring inflation
3 An additional  bank was  jointly owned  by several  provinces  and several  private  sector  entities.
4 Dillinger  and Webb (1996, p.6) note that the provinces  financed  about 60% of their credit needs thrcugh the
provincial banks in 1990.
In a similar way, L6pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) find that state clean government laws and state laws restricting
public spending encourage privatization at the county level in the United States.  They suggest that this might be
because these laws increase the cost of political patronage.
6under control. The main pillar of the Convertibility Plan was the April 1991 Convertibility Law,
which pegged the new Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar and forced the Central Bank to restrict
the monetary base to the dollar value of international reserves. 6 The Convertibility Law, and the
new 1992 Charter of the Central Bank that supported it, had a profound effect on the provincial
governments:
"First, the charter dictated that the central bank could not take any new domestic
assets.  This meant that the provinces could no longer count on the central bank to
rediscount loans by  provincial banks to  provincial governments, ending their
access to seigniorage and the inflation tax.  Second, the charter prohibited the
central bank from guaranteeing bank deposits.  Then provincial banks had to rely
on depositor confidence to maintain liquidity. Both measures reduced the central
bank's  role as  a  lender of last resort  and  hardened the budget constraint  on
provinces, limiting their ability to borrow (indirectly) from the central bank or
from depositors."  (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, p.16)
Because they could no longer rely upon the central bank, these changes meant that the
provinces would have to bail out depositors from their own resources in the case of bank failure.
In this way, by decreasing the benefits associated with owning a bank and increasing the risk, the
Convertibility Plan made owning a poorly performing bank significantly less attractive than it
had been before.
These changes had an immediate impact on several provinces. 7 In November 1991, the
provincial government of Corrientes passed a law  authorizing the privatization of Banco de
Corrientes, and by December 1994, when the "Tequila Crisis" hit Argentina, six provinces had
authorized the privatization of their provincial banks.  The Tequila Crisis had a large impact on
the performance of the provincial banks, imposing substantial fiscal costs upon the provinces
(Clarke and Cull, 1999).  Nervous depositors withdrew deposits from weak banks in both the
public and private  sectors, hitting the  weak public provincial banks hard.  This  forced the
provinces to consider ways to re-capitalize their insolvent banks and to reassess the costs and
benefits of privatization.
6 See World Bank (1998) for a discussion of the Convertibility Plan and its impact on the financial sector.
Clarke  and  Cull  (2000a)  discusses  how  different  incentives in  different  provinces  affected  the  timing  of
privatization in the separate provinces.
7To further encourage privatization, the Menem administration, with the assistance of the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, created the Fondo Fiduciario.  This
agency, which is a part of the federal government, extended loans to help the provinces privatize
their provincial banks.  Since provinces were  only eligible to receive loans from the Fondo
Fiduciario after they had privatized their banks, there was no risk that they would use the funds
to re-capitalize the banks while retaining ownership.  This innovation encouraged the provinces
to split the public provincial banks into two parts before privatization - a healthy bank to be
privatized and a residual entity that contained non-viable assets.  Although the individual cases
varied, the basic strategy was to first shift attractive assets to the privatized entity and then match
those assets with liabilities. Liabilities were added up to the point that the privatized entity's net
worth met Argentina's prudential standards.  The main determinant of the size of the residual
entity was, therefore, the attractiveness of the public provincial bank's assets.  Consequently, the
purchaser of the privatized entity did not have to assume ownership of all pre-privatization assets
and liabilities and the province was able to receive a positive price for the bank.
Since  the  recovery  of  residual  assets  would  not  be  quick  enough,  or  on  such
advantageous terms, to  cover all residual liabilities, the provinces needed a  way to  meet a
substantial portion of their short-term residual obligations.  The provinces used the loans from
the Fondo Fiduciario to do this by converting short-terrn obligations to long-term loans.  From a
political perspective, financing obligations in this way was presumably beneficial, as the yearly
loan payments due  to  the Fondo Fiduciario are less eye-catching than  short-term obligation
payments would have been.  More practically, at this time, the provinces likely could not have
afforded to pay off the short-termn  obligations immediately.
With  this  new  incentive, and  an uncertain liability  hanging over  their  heads, many
additional provinces decided to privatize their banks.  Of the twenty-seven provincial banks,
almost half had been privatized by the end of 1997, and several other privatizations had been
authorized but not completed.  This series of privatizations provides a unique opportunity to
study the factors that  affect politicians'  privatization decisions.  Although other players, for
example the Federal Government of Argentina, the Central Bank of Argentina and international
donors, might have been able to indirectly influence the privatization decision, the final choice
was made by the provincial government.
8C. Provincial  Bank Privatization  Contracts
Because the negotiations were principally over the level of assets and liabilities that the
purchaser would assume, the prices fetched in the completed privatizations were relatively low,
compared to the face value of the assets transferred. Table 1, therefore, focuses on the non-price
features  of  the  privatization  agreements.  In  the  Argentine  context,  two  important  ways
opponents to bank privatization were bought off were through agreements to limit the number of
layoffs or to compensate laid-off workers and to maintain branches in certain cities. Based upon
a review of the requirements imposed on the purchasers of the privatized banks, it appears that
limits on branch closings and layoffs were the rule rather than the exception (Table 1).  Of the
sixteen contracts, half had some restriction on the number of employees that could be dismissed.
Another purchaser agreed  to  implement a job  re-training program.  Three  of the contracts
stipulated that the private purchasers maintain the existing branch network and ten permitted the
closure of branches, but required that the purchaser maintain service provision in all locations
served at the time of privatization.  These contract features strongly suggest that the political
buyoffs present in other privatizations were also evident in Argentina.
As noted above, the public provincial banks were chronic money losers frequently in
need of re-capitalization.  To pass a substantial share of their low-quality assets onto a private
purchaser while, at the same time, imposing branching and labor restrictions on that purchaser
would have been difficult, if not impossible, without concessions on other dimensions. The most
attractive of these were the service contracts that were awarded to purchasers to provide banking
services to the provinces and guarantees as to the quality of the acquired assets.  The service
contracts, which, among other things, provide income to the private owners for coordinating the
payments activities of the provincial government, varied in duration from five to twenty years.
Ten of the sixteen agreements provided service contracts of at least ten years.  In interviews, the
new private owners confirmed that these contracts are of vital importance, as an abnormally high
share of the privatized banks' income is generated from services (see Clarke and Cull, 2000b).
9Table 1: Terms of the Provincial Bank Privatizations
Province  Object of  Branching  Employees  Duration of  Portfolio
(Bank)  Sale  Banking  Guarantees
Service
Contracts
Chaco  60% Class A  Maintain service  Keep at least 715  20 years  None
(6/94)  shares  workers
Entre Rios (12/94)  60% Class A  Maintain  Up to 700 (of  7 years  Up to $26
shares  service, closures  1500) early  million
require approval  voluntary  maximum
retirement
Formosa  60% Class A  Maintain service  --  10 years  35% recovered
(9/95)  shares  residual assets
Misiones  100% Class A  No dismissals in  5 years  Up to $16
(12/95)  shares  first six months;  million
<30%  of  maximum
workforce after
Rio Negro*  Deterrnined  10  years  Up to 80% of
(2/96)  by bidders  portfolio or $50
million
Salta  75% Class A  Maintain similar  10 years  None
(3/96)  shares  geog. Coverage
Tucuman  75% Class A  Maintain service  Workforce <=  IO years  Up to $32
(3/96)  shares  200 at transfer  million
San Luis  100% Class  Maintain service  --  10 years  $16 million
(5/96)  A,B shares  deposit from
province, up to 5
years
Santiago del Estero  95% Class A,  Maintain service  Job re-training  10 years  None
(7/96)  B shares  rom  >  1vr.
San Juan  75% Class A  Maintain similar  --  10 years  None
(7/96)  shares  geog. Coverage
Mendoza  90% Class A  Maintain all  Keep at least 600  5 years  Can substitute p-
(7/96)  shares  branches  workers  tized assets for
residual assets,
Up to $20  million
Mendoza  90% Class A  Maintain all  Keep at least 500  5 years  Can substitute p-
(Prev. Social)  shares  branches  workers  tized assets for
(7/96)  residual assets,
up to $10 million
Municipal de Tucuman  100% Class  Maintain service  Keep at least 70  10 years  Can shift some
(10/97)  A,B shares  workers  assets to the
residual
Jujuy**  80% of  Maintain all  Keep at least 170  10 years  Fund created w/
(1/98)  capital  branches  workers  35% recovered
residual assets
Santa Fe  90% of class  Maintain service  Keep at least  5 years  Up to $43
(5/98)  A shares  in all branches  1500 workers  million
or through paid  guaranteed by a
representatives  bond
Santa Cruz  Not available  Not available  Not available  Not available  Not available
(6/98)  __I_I_I
Source: Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarollo Provincial (FFDP)
*Rio Negro - Portfolio guarantees and flexibility with respect to the object of sale were modifications to original pliego.  Pliegos
were initial announcements by the provinces of the proposed terms of sale.  ** Jujuy - The original pliego was altered to allow
for a higher share of capital to be transferred to the new owner, less stringent restrictions regarding firing, and slightly more
generous guarantees.
10In many cases, however, the lure of the service contract appears to have been insufficient
to entice a private bank to acquire assets of dubious quality.  Rather than ve1  .the quality of
each  individual asset, which  proved time-intensive, many provinces  took to  guaranteeing a
substantial share of the assets transferred to the privatized entity.  In six cases, the province
guaranteed assets up to either a fixed dollar (peso) limit or a certain share of the total assets
acquired.  In two other cases, private owners were able to  substitute assets from the residual
entity for privatized assets during some trial period; in another, the buyer could shift low-quality
assets to the residual for a period.  Finally, in two cases the guarantee was set as a fraction of the
residual assets recovered.  Presumably, since the owner of the privatized entity was also charged
with managing the residual entity, the idea was to increase incentives to recover residual assets.
Only four cases did not guarantee the privatized asset portfolio at all.
Table 1 shows a number of dimensions over which provinces and potential buyers would
negotiate. The single most important, however, was the amount of residual assets to be assumed
by the purchaser.  Table 2 shows the size of the privatized and residual entities for the sixteen
completed privatizations that relied on Fondo Fiduciario assistance. 8 The most striking feature
of the data is the size of the residual entities.  In only four of fifteen cases for which data are
available did the province manage to transfer more than half of the pre-privatization assets to the
purchaser and one of these (Entre Rios) is somewhat misleading.  Both Entre Rios and Chaco
had nearly finalized their privatizations before the Fondo Fiduciario became operational.  A
desire to provide some fiscal relief to these early privatizers enabled them to enter the program
after the fact.  Because most details of these two privatizations had been worked out, however,
neither transaction was typical of those that followed.  In particular, Entre Rios transferred all
pre-privatization assets to the purchaser, and later used Fondo Fiduciario assistance to guarantee
some of them.
s
We refer to the cases listed in Table 2 as provincial bank privatizations throughout the paper.  One of the
sixteen,  Municipal  de Tucuman,  is referred  to as a municipal  rather  than a provincial  bank in Argentina. Because
municipal bank privatizations  were  also eligible for  Fondo Fiduciario assistance,  we  include that case  in our
analysis. Data for another,  the Santa Fe privatization,  were not yet available  as of our last visit to Buenos  Aires
(January 1999).
11Table 2: Sizes of Privatized and Residual Entities
Bank  Privatized Entity  Residual Entity  % Transferred to  Residual
Private Owner
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities  Asset  As % of
(million  (million  (million  (million  (million  (million  recovery  Assets
pesos)  pesos)  pesos)  pesos)  pesos)  pesos)  (mil)
Chaco  42.9  34.5  245.3  233.1  15%  13%  0*  0%
Entre Rios  425.5  414.5  0.0  0.0  100%  100%  --  --
Formosa  26.5  11.5  135.7  244.9  16%  4%  5.2*  4%
Misiones  67.2  57.8  133.9  340.8  33%  14%  6.1  5%
Rio Negro  59.4  47.4  379.2  402.6  14%  11%  6.0  2%
Salta  42.9  41.0  70.0  68.4  38%  37%  17.6*  25%
Tucuman  66.9  56.9  261.7  262.9  20%  18%  5.3  2%
San Luis  38.6  38.6  29.7  81.8  56%  32%  1.7  6%
Sant. Estero  43.8  43.5  199.6  227.3  18%  16%  7.5  4%
San Juan  173.9  158.9  78.6  175.3  69%  48%  2.3  3%
Mendoza'  335.1  326.9  666.6  666.6  33%  33%  14.3  1%
Prev. Social  62.9  41.0  292.1  292.1  18%  12%  --  --
Mun. Tucuman  38.2  32.2  38.1  25.7  50%  56%  n.a.  n.a.
Jujuy  35.7  33.7  206.9  218.7  15%  13%  n.a.  n.a.
Santa Fe  --  --  --  --  --  --
Santa Cruz  157.9  142.9  37.7  126.9  81%  53%  n.a.  n.a.
Source:  Fondo Fiduciario.
* Province also refinanced some (less than ten percent) of residual assets.  Refinancings are not included in the recovery figures
presented here.
III. A Simple Model of Bank Privatization
A. Conceptual Framework
Our basic premise is that political and economic constraints dictate the timing and design
of bank privatizations, and that timing and design, in turn, affect post-privatization performance.
This will help us understand the second link in the framework, which will focus on how political
and economic constraints affect features of the privatizations (including privatization contracts).
We begin our study of privatization contract features with a simple theoretical model.  We will
then use the sample of Argentine bank transactions to test our predictions.  Understanding the
political economy of privatization decisions and contracts should also help us better assess the
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Since many of the public banks were insolvent - or close to insolvent - at the time of
sale, the provincial govermments  often considered restructuring the banks before the sale.  For
example, many of the banks were significantly overstaffed or had inefficient branch networks.
Since the private buyers might want to reduce these problems by laying off surplus workers or
closing branches (often in rural areas), governments had to decide how much of the cost saving
restructuring they would allow.  Another fundamental restructuring problem was handling the
mountain  of  non-performing assets  in  the  portfolios of  insolvent  state-owned banks.  As
Verbrugge, Megginson, and Owens (1999) note:
"Effective  methods of  dealing  with  bad  loans  prior  to  or  during  the
privatization process are essential. This problem is especially severe in situations
where uncollectable loans are outstanding to state-owned enterprises."
Argentina's relatively successful provincial privatizations centered on the creation of residual
entities for the  low-quality assets and  liabilities not  assumed by  the  private purchaser.  In
13addition, an insolvent state-owned bank could be sold in its entirety to whoever bids the least
negative price. 9 Whatever the method, however, most sources agree that handling accumulated
bad  loans  is  the  vital  aspect of  bank  privatization.  In  addition  to  increasing  sales price,
restructuring might also make the bank more attractive to better quality buyers, who might be
worried about the effect of buying a large non-performing portfolio on their own credit rating.
Many decisions are affected by political considerations.  For example, it seems plausible
that governments that are willing to remove most, or all, of the non-performing loans from the
banks'  portfolios, will  be  able  to  demand  more  attractive terms  from  buyers  along  other
dimensions.  They might  then be  able to  demand fewer layoffs  or  impose  greater service
requirements (e.g., in rural areas).  In contrast, when the government retains a large stake in the
bank after privatization, the buyer could probably demand concessions along other dimensions.
The theoretical model below summarizes the tradeoffs faced by two agents, a government
and a potential buyer, in the sale of an insolvent state-owned bank.  Although the model does not
capture all the tradeoffs facing the players, it captures many of the features discussed above. The
purchaser is concerned about the probability that the privatized bank will remain solvent, the
profits earned if the bank does so, and the price paid for the assets and liabilities it assumes. The
probability of solvency we denotef(xr), which is decreasing in xr, the risky assets assumed by the
purchaser.  We  assume  that  the purchaser takes  on  state-owned bank  assets of  decreasing
marginal value, which adversely affect the probability that the privatized bank survives.
The purchaser's expected profit stream is composed of interest income from its portfolio
of non-guaranteed assets, minus the privatized bank's  operating costs. 10 Interest income on
performing assets we denote h(xr)xr, where h(xr), the expected average net interest rate on the
portfolio of risky assets (net of losses on non-performing assets), is decreasing in xr.  In other
words, as the purchaser assumes assets of declining marginal value, the probability that each
additional asset will be non-performing increases, and the net expected average interest rate on
9Ramachandran  (1995) points out that this is essentially the approach taken by the Resolution Trust Corporation in
the United States. However, in practice, it is difficult to sell banks for 'negative'  prices for political reasons.
10  For tractability, the guaranteed assets themselves do not enter into this simple model.
14the entire portfolio declines.  Operating costs are denoted wL where w is the wage paid to bank
employees and L the number of employees. The buyer, therefore, receives:
rI = f (X,)[h(x,)x,  -wL]k  (1)
where k~-0...  11 is  the  share of  the  expected profit stream retained  by  the purchaser. The
government receives a price P, which is equal to 1-k times the profit stream as payment from the
purchaser for the assets and liabilities (and the charter) of the state-owned bank:
P = (1-k) f(xr) [h(xr)  Xr -WL]  (2)
In other words, the share of the expected profit that is not retained by the purchaser equals the
payment received by the govemment.
The government derives fiscal benefits from this transaction not only through P, but also
from recovery of residual assets, denoted g(xres)  Xres,  where Xres  is the quantity of assets in a
residual  entity managed by the government.  We assume that g(xres)  is increasing in Xres,  which
indicates that the marginal recovery rate of residual assets is increasing in the amount of assets
assumed by the government.  This stems from the decreasing marginal value of each additional
asset assumed by the purchaser in these transactions.
The final component of the government's optimization function is the benefits it receives
from patronage jobs  at the privatized bank, which we denote KLL, where K,  is the per-worker
benefit to the government."  We include this component because limits on layoffs have been a
recurrent  feature  when  crafting  politically  feasible  privatizations.  We  assume  that  the
government chooses Xres  and L to maximize the following:
MAX U = KM [g(xreS)  X,re  + P] + KL *  L
X_,L  (3)
subject to xr  + Xre=  XPUb
We follow  the model  in Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994)  in assuming  that the government  does  not necessarily  act in
the public interest. They  assume  that, because  the public  is disorganized,  politicians  can cater to interest  groups,
such as labor  unions,  rather than the median  voter. In our model,  this concept  is captured  by KL,  the per worker
benefit  of an additional  bank employee. Fiscal benefits  to politicians,  which need not be spent on projects  that
promote  the public  interest,  are captured  by KM,  which  we describe  below.
15where KM maps the net fiscal benefits of the transaction into the government's utility function,
and Xpub denotes the total assets of the state bank (prior to privatization).  The constraint implies
that the assets of the state-owned bank end up in one of two places: as non-guaranteed assets
assumed by the purchaser or as assets that remain with government in the residual entity.
Equilibrium bank privatization contracts are characterized by two first order conditions,
which must be satisfied  jointly:
AU  / aL = -w(l  - k)f  (X,)KM + KL =  0  (4)
aU /ax,  r  KM  [g'(Xpu,b  - XrXp-X,  )  -g(xpub  -X,)]  (5)
+ (1  - k)[f'(x,  )(h(x,)x,  - wL) + f (x,)h(x,)  + h'(x,)f  (x, )x,] = O
In  equation  (5),  we  substitute  Xpub  - Xr  for  Xres,  which  enables  us  to  express  the
government's decision to apportion assets between the residual and the privatized entity solely in
terms of xr. This simple framework captures many of the salient tradeoffs underlying most bank
privatizations.  The equilibrium contracts are described in terms of the assets assumed by the
purchaser, the assets retained by the government, and the jobs preserved by the government.
C. Comparative Statics: Simulation Results
From this framework, we can generate comparative statics results that describe how the
equilibrium contract varies with respect to the government's fiscal situation (through KM), the
political  strength of workers  and  unions (through KL),  the  government's  ability to  recover
residual assets (through g(xres)),  the repayment rates on risky assets managed by the privatized
bank (through h(xr)),  and the prospects of future solvency for the privatized entity (throughf(xr)).
In this section, we highlight a handful of the predictions from the model, which we then test in
the next section.
One simple way to highlight these predictions is through a simple simulation exercise.
We assume that the three key functional relationships in our model, h(Xr),f(xr),  and g(xres,),  are all
linear. The parameters used in the simulations are summarized in Table 3. The buyer's expected
return on its portfolio of risky assets is of the form h(xr)  a,. - 6i,x,;  the government's expected
return on the residual portfolio is  of the form g(x,es)=  ares + f.resxres.  This  construction is
16intended to capture the buyer's  ability to select the assets that it wanted in these transactions.
Buyers, therefore, took on additional assets of increasingly poorer quality, which implies that
sellers, that is, the provincial governments, took on assets on increasingly higher quality in their
residual entities.  We also assume that  fi, I  > I  fires  I, which implies that, for a given asset, the
privatized bank is more likely to recover than is the government through its residual entity. This
simply indicates that the bank is better at managing a loan portfolio than is the government. The
probability of future solvency of the privatized bank, which is also decreasing in xr, is of the
formf(xr) = a  -/isxr.  We assume that I  f,  I  > I  PB  |,  which implies that additional assets decrease
the return on the loan portfolio more than they do the probability of the bank's  insolvency. The
results from simulations using these parameters are summarized in Figures 1-5.
17Table 3: Parameters Used in Simulations
Future  Solvency  of Privatized  Bank: f(xr) = 1 -. 001  xr
Buyer  Management  of Loan Portfolio:  h(xr) =  1 - .01  xr
Gov't  Management  of the Residual  Entity:  g(xres) =.005xres
Gov't  Utility  Weight  for Money:  KM  = .001
Gov't Utility Weight for Labor: KL =  .000003
Wage  Paid to Labor: w = .0066
Share of Expected Profit Stream Retained by Buyer: k =  .5
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Figure 5: Equilibrium L as Prospects for Buyer's Future
20The predictions that we can test focus mainly on the fiscal situation of the provinces and
the probable effects of the Tequila Crisis.  In our simple model, fiscal effects operate through
KM. Some of the comparative statics results for KM  are immediately evident from the first order
conditions.  For example, making the linear substitutions for h(xr), ffXr), and g(xres)described
above, and rearranging the first order condition in equation (4), yields:
LK  (6)
r g3  KM8 w(l5  W(-k)
This indicates that the equilibrium xr is linearly increasing in KM, which implies that the
equilibrium residual entity (xre.)  becomes smaller as the government's fiscal situation worsens.
All else equal, provinces in dire fiscal situations should have been more likely to shift assets to
the privatized bank to get them off their own books. Figure 3 provides the simulation results that
illustrate this point.
The other testable predictions of the model are best illustrated by the simulation results
rather than through algebra.  Figure 1 illustrates that, as a province's  fiscal situation worsened,
politicians could afford to protect the jobs of fewer bank employees (i.e., L* was lower).  They
became increasingly focused on ridding their balance sheet of the non-performing assets in their
provincial banks rather than on protecting patronage jobs.  Figure 2 illustrates that, as /f, (the rate
at which the privatized bank's average return declines as it assumes more risky assets) increases,
L* declines.  If we take /3r  to be an indication of the ability of the buyer to manage the portfolio,
this suggests that weaker buyers meant that provincial governments could afford to protect fewer
jobs.  This  simulation result  will  be  more  difficult  to  test  than  the  ones  regarding  the
government's fiscal situation.  As a proxy, we will use the size of the public provincial bank
relative to the total provincial banking sector.  In more remote places, the public provincial bank
typically dominated the local banking sector, and it was very difficult to attract qualified buyers.
In the linear case of our simple model, many of the comparative statics results are also
linear.  Non-linearities are introduced through the future solvency parameters in h(x,). Figure 4
illustrates that, as 8,, the rate at which the assumption of additional assets negatively affects
future solvency, increases, the buyer assumes fewer risky assets and the residual entity grows
larger.  Figure 5 illustrates that the effects of/,h on labor (L*) are more complicated.  For lower
values, an increase in fl, implies more protection of jobs by the government.  This suggests that,
21up to a point, the government looks towards job protection as a source of utility as the prospects
of the bank's future solvency decline. After that point, however, the solvency concerns become
more severe, the government must give up some jobs, and L* declines.  We operationalize the
Tequila Crisis as a shock to /35  - portfolios deteriorated so rapidly during the crisis that buyers
had to worry more about future solvency, and these worries were, therefore, taken into account
by the government in its optimization problem (equations 4 and 5).  We expect the Tequila Crisis
to have had a negative effect on both L* and xr .
IV.  Empirical Results
A.  The Timing of Provincial Bank Privatization
One way  of  gaining insight into politicians'  motivations is to  look at the timing  of
privatization.  In  general,  it  is  not  straightforward to  empirically test  what  factors  affect
privatization decisions.  Country case studies often describe bank privatization as  occurring
quickly or slowly, but the relevant questions is "compared to what?"  Even if it were easy to
classify privatization processes by  speed, uncovering the reasons  for those  outcomes in the
context of a single country study requires that different policy makers make different decisions
within the period being studied.  In this way, the variation in privatization decisions could be
linked to variation in both the constraints faced by policy makers and the quality of the banks to
be sold.  However, when the privatization decisions are made at the federal level, there will
usually not be sufficient comparable data in a single country.
Clarke  and  Cull  (2000a)  analyzes  the  timing  of  provincial  bank  privatizations  in
Argentina.  The transactions  represent a  unique opportunity for analysis because provincial
policy makers in twenty-three different provinces were making something akin to a "one-shot"
decision within a relatively  short period.  Consequently, there is  significant variation along
several important dimensions within a  uniform institutional  framework, allowing a  detailed
econometric  analysis of  some  aspects of  privatization decisions.  This  unique  institutional
backdrop means that it is possible to identify the effects of fiscal constraints, bank quality, and
other political considerations on decisions to privatize.  Not only did some provinces choose to
privatize while others did not, those that did, chose to do so at different times.
22To exploit this variation in both decisions and timing, Clarke and Cull (2000a) estimate a
discrete-time hazard  model using  data  from  between  1992  and  1996.  The  probability of
privatization was allowed to vary across periods, making it possible to disentangle factors that
affected all  provinces (e.g., the  Convertibility Plan  and  the Tequila Crisis)  from province-
specific effects (bank quality, fiscal pressures, and internal political pressures). They find strong
empirical support for the hypothesis that political economic incentives affected the likelihood of
privatization.  In  particular,  poor  performance  (which  might  reflect  failures  in  corporate
governance) encouraged privatization, while overstaffing (a reflection of the power of workers)
and size (relative to the local banking sector) decreased the likelihood of privatization.  Other
factors, including political affiliation of policymakers and fiscal performance of the province, did
not appear to have a consistent effect on the likelihood of privatization.
B. Determinants of Contract Features
In this sub-section, we study characteristics of the banks and provinces that affected the
outcomes of the negotiations between the private buyers and the provinces. Ideally, we would be
interested in factors that might affect either the preferences of policymakers or the attractiveness
of the bank to potential buyers.  Unfortunately, the small number of observations severely limits
our ability to specify a complete model, test plausible variables and control for demographic
factors that might affect contract provisions.
The contract provisions studied are: restrictions on layoffs; the percent  of privatized
assets guaranteed by the province; the percent of public bank assets taken by the privatized bank
rather than put into the residual entity; the price paid relative to size of the bank; and the length
of the service contract.  We do not look at branching restrictions because there was not enough
variation to estimate a model with this as the dependent variable. 12 In general, we would expect
policymakers to prefer fewer layoffs, smaller residual entities, smaller guarantees and a higher
price. Although it is not immediately clear that politicians would prefer shorter to longer service
contracts, as noted above, the new owners tended to prefer longer contracts.  Since we do not
12 That is, if we estimate  a simple  probit model  with a dummy  variable  indicating  branching  restriction,  there are
only  two cases  with  no restrictions  (see  Table 1). A multivariate  model  would  be go far beyond  the data constraints.
23observe  uniformly  long  contracts,  this  suggests policymakers preferred  some  limits.  One
plausible reason for this might be that policymakers believed they could reduce the price of these
services, in the future, through competitive bidding.
The independent variables include two that might proxy for policymaker's preferences
and three variables that might affect how attractive buyers find the bank.  The variables that
proxy for the preferences of provincial policymakers are the political affiliation of the governor
and a measure of the province's fiscal deficit.  Although the preferences of other policymakers
might also affect contract provisions, past work has suggested that the political affiliation of the
governor appears to  be  a  reasonable proxy  for  preferences regarding  bank privatization in
Argentina.1 3
We find that provinces with governors who were members of the Partido Justicialista
(PJ) tended to allow fewer layoffs, provide smaller guarantees, have relatively smaller residual
entities and grant shorter service contracts (See Table 4).  These results are somewhat surprising,
since they do not indicate any tradeoff between different provisions.  For example, we might
expect parties that rely upon the support of  labor to  allow fewer layoffs, but assume larger
residual entities or provide larger guarantees. Further, the coefficient on this variable is positive,
but insignificant, in the price equation.  One possible explanation for this result is that after
controlling  for  bank  performance,  PJ  governors  appeared  more  willing  to  privatize  their
province's provincial bank (Clarke and Cull, 2000a).
Since provinces tended to become more willing to privatize the bank as its performance
deteriorated, it is possible that banks privatized in provinces with opposition governors were, on
average, less attractive overall.  If this poor performance is not captured by the performance
measure  included  in  the  regression  (i.e.,  net  worth  of  the  public  provincial  bank  before
privatization), the dummy for PJ governor might be proxying for performance. In other words, it
may be best  to  think of  the PJ  variable as  a  control for bank  quality,  and  focus on  other
explanatory variables to describe the tradeoffs that were made to facilitate these transactions.
13Clarke and Cull (2000a) find that this variable tends to be more highly significant in determining the likelihood of
privatization than the political affiliation of the provincial legislature.  Further, in practice, when a single opposition
party had a majority in one, or both, chambers of the legislature, the govemor belonged to that party.
24The  size of  the province's  fiscal deficit might also  affect  the preferences of policy
makers.  First, provinces with large fiscal deficits might put greater emphasis on the speed with
which the transaction is completed (i.e., to quickly receive privatization proceeds and reduce the
drain of supporting the public bank).  If this were the case, they might not be willing to walk
away from negotiations that are going poorly, or to take tough bargaining positions and risk the
private partner walking away.  Therefore, we might expect provinces with higher deficits to
achieve generally worse outcomes than other provinces (i.e., more layoffs, more guarantees, and
lower prices).
In  addition, the  fiscal  deficit might  also  affect  how  policymakers  weight different
provisions.  For example, they might be more willing to trade off restrictions on layoffs and
guarantee a greater part of the loan portfolio in return for a higher price.  The results in Table 4
support this  second  hypothesis.  In  general,  provinces with  high  deficits  imposed  fewer
restrictions on layoffs and guaranteed more assets, but received a higher price (relative to the size
of the bank before privatization). 14 Interestingly, they also tended to privatize a greater share of
the public banks'  assets (see Column 2), although this result is not  highly significant.  One
possible reason for this  might be  that the Fondo Fiduciario loan often did not  cover all the
liabilities of the residual entity.  Provinces with large deficits might have preferred to assume
fewer liabilities (and poor quality assets), that would affect provincial finances in the near terrn,
in return for more layoffs and higher guarantees. 
1 5
The analysis includes three variables to proxy for the attractiveness of the bank - the net
worth (relative to liabilities) of the public provincial bank before privatization, the size of the
public bank relative to the size of the provincial banking sector and a dummy for whether the
contract was written before the Tequila crisis occurred. It seems reasonable that potential buyers
14 We measure  price  relative  to pre-privatization  assets  because  that measure  is a better  indicator  of the eventual  size
of the privatized  entity. The privatized  banks  have  grown  very  quickly  since  privatization  (Clarke  and  Cull, 2000b)
and it seems likely that they will be similar  in size to the public banks once they reach equilibrium. We are
presuming,  therefore,  that buyers' bids primarily  reflected  the future  value  of conducting  a banking  business  in the
province  (while  retaining  the name  of the provincial  bank,  rather  than as a new entrant).
5 Although  guarantees  have  the potential  to affect  provincial  finances,  politicians  with  short time  horizons  might  be
less  worried  about  the potential  for future  problems  than about  the immediate  problems  of large residual  entities. In
addition,  disbursement  of FFDP funds was tied to completing  the privatization  process. Those  provinces  most in
25would be more interested in a public bank, if they believe that the bank was already operating
relatively efficiently.  For example, stronger performance might suggest that the bank's staff or
assets are better  quality.  Consequently, this  measure should be  negatively  correlated with
allowed layoffs, positively correlated with the size of privatized bank (i.e., negatively correlated
with the size of the residual entity), negatively correlated with the percent of assets guaranteed
by the province and positively correlated with the price.  The correlation with the length of the
service contract is less clear.  Although provinces might have to sweeten the deal with poorly
performing banks by providing longer service contracts, they might also be less wary about
signing  long  contracts  with  better  quality provincial banks.'6 The results  in  Table  4  are
consistent with these hypotheses, although the coefficients are statistically insignificant in four of
the five regressions.
The second variable is the size of the public bank's  loan portfolio relative to the size of
the provincial banking sector.  The public provincial banks  were quite large relative to  the
provincial banking sectors - typically accounting for between 40 and 70% of total lending in the
province (Clarke and Cull, 2000b).  If large provincial banks were able to exploit significant
market power, then provinces privatizing large provincial banks might have believed that they
would be able to extract monopoly rents through the bidding process.  For example, prices rnight
be higher or the provinces might be able to restrict layoffs more.  The market power potentially
exercised by the public provincial banks that we allude to is not the type that leads to restricted
output (credit) and higher prices (interest rates).17 We mean, rather, their ability to drive private
competitors from the market, perhaps through issuance of credit at subsidized interest rates.  In
places where they had done this effectively, the private owner of the provincial bank might have
anticipated little competitive threat, at least in the near tern.  Because provinces would no longer
be able to manipulate interest rates directly (and could not do so indirectly through regulation),
fiscal need may have been less willing to go through  a lengthy  asset quality verification  process with potential
purchasers,  and  thus were  more  willing  to use  guarantees  to speed  the transaction  along.
6 The implicit  assumption  is that higher quality  public banks are more likely to become  high quality  privatized
banks.
17 The poor performance of the public provincial banks strongly suggests that they were not 'profit maximizing' in
this sense.
26they may have felt most justified  in extracting rents from bidders in those places where the
provincial bank had most dominated the pre-privatization provincial landscape.
In practice, the reverse seems true - provinces with dominant public banks managed to
impose fewer restrictions on layoffs and had to assume a greater share of the public bank's assets
and liabilities.  This suggests that buyers did not see size (relative to the local banking sector) as
a positive factor. Phrased another way, the dominance of the provincial bank signaled that it was
located in  an  unattractive banking area rather  than in  an  area ripe  for  extraction of  large
monopoly rents.  The coefficient on the length of the service contract was also positive and
significant.  This is consistent with the previous two results - contract provisions were more
generous to the buyer when the bank was relatively large.  However, the last result might also be
because in provinces with  large provincial banks,  there simply might not  have been much
possible competition for the service contract. Consequently, the provinces would have been less
able to rely upon other banks for these services and, therefore, might gain less from competitive
bidding. The coefficients on the size of the public bank relative to the provincial banking sector
were  insignificant in  the  other two  equations (price  and percent  of the  portfolio that  was
guaranteed). In summary, the first three results suggest that the public provincial banks were not
exploiting market power so as to preclude pre-privatization entry (or, at least, the new private
owners did not think that they would be able to continue do so).
Finally, the regression also includes a dummy variable indicating whether the contract
was written before, or after, the Tequila Crisis.'8 One reason for including this variable is that
the early privatizations were  started before the Fondo Fiduciario was operational.  It  is not
immediately clear what effect the Fondo Fiduciario would have on contract provisions.  For
example, it might improve contract provisions  (in the view  of provincial policyrnakers) by
reducing the pressure for quick privatizations, since the province would have to worry less about
the bank  deteriorating while it was waiting to  be  privatized.  However, viewing the Fondo
Fiduciario as a sort of free lunch program ignores the evolving bargaining situation between the
provinces and the federal government.  Since many poorly perforning  public provincial banks
18 The Tequila  crisis began as an exchange  rate crisis, following  the devaluation  in Mexico  in December  1994.
However,  the loss of confidence  also  affected  other  Latin American  countries,  which  led to shrinkage  of Argentina's
domestic  economy  and a run on many  poorly  performing  domestic  banks.
27lost considerable deposits during the Tequila crisis and, therefore, required liquidity injections
from federal sources, provincial politicians were in no position to request many favors.  Their
banks were adversely affecting the province's fiscal situation, they needed immediate relief, and
they would  have to  accept the terms  on  which  it was  offered.  Indeed, Fondo Fiduciario
employees worked closely with provinces to draft the terms of sale and they determined the
amounts to be disbursed to each province. 19 In these ways, Fondo Fiduciario involvement might
have actually increased pressure on the provinces to act more quickly.
The crisis itself, and the resulting deposit loss, also must have made the provincial banks
less attractive to potential purchasers.  The results in Table 4 suggest that the strict provisions
imposed by the Fondo or the diminished attractiveness of the provincial banks following the
crisis (or both) affected contract terms.  Most provisions were better, in the view of provincial
policymakers, before the crisis - fewer layoffs were allowed and more assets were transferred to
the privatized bank. These results are interesting when combined with the results on the timing of
privatization, which  indicated that  the  external shock  of  the Tequila  crisis  and  poor  bank
performance increased the likelihood of privatization.  Here we find that the Tequila crisis, poor
performance, and involvement with the Fondo Fiduciario are correlated with  worse contract
provisions from the viewpoint of provincial policymakers.  This suggests that if policymakers
wait until  an  external crisis or poor performance forces the province  to privatize,  then the
outcome will be less good from their viewpoint.  They will be able to guarantee fewer jobs, will
be left with larger residual entities, and will be forced to guarantee more of the privatized bank's
assets.  However, some post-privatization performance data in Clarke and Cull (2000b) shows
that the early privatizations were among the least successful.  In the end, the best privatization
outcomes may only come about when political decision-makers have fewer choices. 20
19 The terms  of sale and the disbursements  were  also subject  to World  Bank approval.
20 A more charitable  interpretation  would be that, in cases where a politician  already recognizes  the benefits  of
privatization,  a crisis might  help  her win support  for that  position.
28Table 4: Effect of political variables on restrictions in contract
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Estimation Method  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Least  Least
________________________________________  Squares  Squares
Dependent Variable  Minimum  Percent of  Percent of  Price  Length of
percent of  assets  portfolio  over  pre-  service
workers that  assumed by  guaranteed  privatization  contract
new owners  privatized  by province*  assets
must keep  bank
Number of Observations  15  14  14  15  15
Degrees of Freedom  . . ..........- 10  9  9  10  10
Constant  0.512  0.238  0.650**  0.040  7.994**
-...---....-....  (1.77)  . (3.54)  (2.26)  (1  182)  (3.64) Dum  y  indc  t  g P  ..........................................  ...  . ........  0 .254  -_  . ........  -_  .?  ~  V-  ... ....  . .....
Dummy indicating PJ Governor  1  .308'"  0.275**  -0.720***  -0 005  -5.090**
(t-s t)  _(3.35  (2.32.)  (-07)  +2.93)
Net worth of public provincial bank  -0.910  0.480  -2.557*  0.031  1.442
ts  % of liabilities) t-stat9  .. 3)  (  .1.)  (0  ..  (1)..5
Lagged Provincial deficit (over revenues)  -8.037**'  0.553  1.458**  0.125**  1.605
(t-sta)2  (-3.72)  (1.77)  (2.53)  (2.65)  (0.34
Loans by public bank (as % of loans in province)  .1.9  .0.61**  -0.484  -024  10.  654**
.t-stat.  ..  ... 2.71).  (.2.28)  (0.859  (-0.65)  (2.91)
Dummy indicating before Tequila Crisis  2.132'**  0.442**  -0.285  -0.025  2.449
(t-stat)  (3.99)  (2.96)  (-1.37)  (-1.22)  (1.20)
H' (pseudo R' for Tobit regressions)  1.12  2.59  0.69  0.51  0.67
Excludes guarantees as percent of recovered residual assets
C. The Effect of Contract Features on Post-Privatization  Performance
Clarke and  Cull (2000b) indicates that the transition  from  a  typical provincial bank
portfolio has followed a predictable pattern - in most cases, there was a substantial reduction in
credit to the financial and public sectors.  The largest growth category has been personal lending.
Interviews with owners of the privatized banks indicate that this lending is less risky than other
types, because as bankers to the province, they assumed many payments systems responsibilities,
including payments to  public  employees.  Payments for many types  of personal loans  are
automatically deducted from the accounts of the public employees.  Growth in other, less secure,
types of lending is much slower.  Owners indicated that it requires time to build up a  solid
lending  clientele among  businesses, especially  since many  of  the  new  owners have  little
experience in this area.
Signs of growing pains were, however, evident.  As the equity and asset base of the new
banks increased, their ROA and ROE figures tended to decline. One could argue that these were
initially abnormally high due to the heavy reliance on service income and their low levels of
assets and equity.  Because the privatized banks  are clearly going through  an  equilibration
process, and because the post-privatization time-series is quite short (we have only one to three
years of data), we have not been able to find strong associations between contract features and
29performance.  As  time  passes,  and  more  data  become  available,  we  expect  that  such
relationships, if they exist, will become more evident.
V.  Conclusions
The privatization literature has not  devoted substantial attention to  the incentives of
politicians in  describing privatization outcomes, perhaps because  it has  lacked the kinds  of
evidence necessary to do so.  Argentina's provincial bank privatizations of the  1990s offer a
unique opportunity to study these issues.  Multiple sets of provincial politicians, each one facing
different constraints, crafted agreements with private purchasers for the sale of their loss-making
public banks.  The privatization contracts differed substantially.  We offered a simple theory to
illustrate the trade-offs faced by  a self-interested (rather than  a purely welfare maximizing)
politician in creating these contracts.
A number of our theoretical predictions are supported by the evidence.  For example,
politicians in  provinces with  poor  fiscal health  were  able to  preserve jobs  for fewer bank
employees, had  smaller residual entities, and received higher payments  for their banks.  In
addition, the evidence suggests that the Tequila Crisis meant that politicians could protect fewer
jobs and had to assume a higher share of their public banks' assets.  Finally, our model predicted
that buyers with less expertise in managing a loan portfolio would enable governments to protect
fewer jobs.  In locations where the provincial bank dominated the local financial landscape, and
buyers were presumably difficult to attract, politicians were able to  protect fewer jobs.  The
implications for post-privatization performance of these contract features are hard to discern
given so little available data.  However, there is some evidence that performance has been better
at banks privatized after the Tequila Crisis, which suggests that, by tying politicians' hands, the
Crisis may have wrought some unforeseen benefits.  While that conjecture clearly awaits further
empirical validation, our hope is that, by explicitly incorporating the incentives facing politicians
into the analysis, we will be able to begin to address the question of why some privatizations are
more successful than others.
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